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**POST-2027 SPECIAL AUTONOMY FISCAL EMERGENCY:
AGGRESSIVE STRATEGIES TO RESCUE ACEH'S OWN-SOURCE
REVENUE THROUGH TAX INTENSIFICATION
AND ASSET OPTIMIZATION****T. Mochammad Iephone Ansharie**

Aceh Financial Management Agency

Email: teukuiephone@acehprov.go.id**ABSTRACT**

Aceh Province is currently on the brink of a structural fiscal crisis as the Special Autonomy Fund (Otsus) is set to expire in 2027. The threat of a chronic deficit in the Aceh Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBA) directly conflicts with the region's high vulnerability to natural disasters and the urgent need to maintain a social safety net for its 5.63 million residents. Ironically, amid positive macroeconomic growth and a real-sector export surplus, Aceh's own-source revenue (PAA) capacity has stagnated due to collection inefficiencies, tax regulatory relaxation, and the mismanagement of Aceh's State-Owned Assets (BMA), which has left hundreds of high-value assets idle. Using a qualitative approach with a case study design, this policy paper examines these gaps through a TOWS matrix analysis and a policy evaluation using William Dunn's method. The results of the mathematical analysis place Aceh's revenue management in Quadrant IV (Weaknesses-Threats), which demands radical corrective action. This paper recommends implementing a Defensive-Aggressive (Turnaround) Strategy through repressive tax enforcement and a total restructuring of dividends from Regionally Owned Enterprises (BUMD). This emergency policy is absolutely necessary to capitalize on tax potential, whereby all revenue surpluses must be earmarked to fund Unforeseen Expenditures (BTT) for disaster relief in order to safeguard Aceh's fiscal autonomy and the safety of its people.

Keywords: Fiscal Emergency, Special Autonomy Fund, Tax Intensification, Asset Optimization, Disaster Mitigation.

ABSTRAK

Provinsi Aceh saat ini berada di ambang krisis fiskal struktural seiring berakhirnya penerimaan Dana Otonomi Khusus (Otsus) pada tahun 2027. Ancaman defisit Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Aceh (APBA) yang kronis ini berbenturan langsung dengan tingginya kerentanan bencana alam serta kebutuhan mendesak untuk menjaga jaring pengaman sosial bagi 5,63 juta jiwa penduduk. Ironisnya, di tengah geliat pertumbuhan ekonomi makro yang positif dan surplus ekspor sektor riil, kapasitas Pendapatan Asli Aceh (PAA) justru stagnan akibat inefisiensi pemungutan, relaksasi regulasi pajak, serta tata kelola Barang Milik Aceh (BMA) yang membiarkan ratusan aset bernilai tinggi tertidur (idle). Menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan desain studi kasus, makalah kebijakan ini membedah kesenjangan tersebut melalui analisis matriks TOWS dan evaluasi kebijakan metode William Dunn. Hasil analisis secara matematis menempatkan tata kelola pendapatan Aceh pada Kuadran IV (Weakness-Threats), yang menuntut tindakan penyelamatan radikal. Makalah ini merekomendasikan penerapan Strategi Defensif-Agresif (Turnaround) melalui penegakan hukum pajak (tax enforcement) secara represif dan restrukturisasi total dividen Badan Usaha Milik Daerah (BUMD). Kebijakan darurat ini bersifat mutlak guna mengkapitalisasi potensi perpajakan, di mana seluruh lonjakan pendapatan wajib dikunci (earmarked) untuk membiayai Belanja Tidak Terduga (BTT) kebencanaan demi menyelamatkan kemandirian fiskal dan keselamatan rakyat Aceh.

Kata Kunci: Darurat Fiskal, Dana Otonomi Khusus, Intensifikasi Pajak, Optimalisasi Aset, Mitigasi Bencana.

INTRODUCTION

Aceh Province is currently in a crucial transitional phase of development, where economic recovery efforts must proceed hand-in-hand with dynamic demographic challenges. Based on the latest statistical data, Aceh's population growth rate stands at 1.36 percent per year, bringing the total population to 5.63 million by 2025. This demographic growth is, in fact, a robust form of social capital, especially given that Aceh's macroeconomic performance in the first quarter of 2026 showed positive and promising growth of 4.09 percent *year-on-year* (y-o-y). This impressive growth momentum absolutely requires a foundation of sound regional fiscal autonomy so that the vision of equitable welfare as mandated in the Aceh Governor's Vision and Mission for 2025–2030 can truly be realized. The vision of achieving economic self-reliance and sustainable development demands an expansive fiscal space to fund strategic programs for basic services. Ironically, this noble aspiration is currently confronted by pressing social vulnerabilities, where the Open Unemployment Rate (OUR) remains at 5.88 percent and inflation continues to erode purchasing power at a rate of 3.88 percent. This empirical reality demands serious action from the local government to ensure that development commitments are not hindered by insufficient social safety net capacity.

On the other hand, Aceh actually harbors an economic paradox that holds extraordinary potential if managed using a precise government-business paradigm. International trade activities recorded remarkable achievements, with the value of goods exports reaching 59.33 million USD in March 2026, resulting in a trade balance surplus of 16.16 million USD. These high export values and commodity flows indicate strong capital turnover and significant *taxable capacity* at the heart of the real sector. However, the luster of this macroeconomic growth is one-sided because it has not yet been optimally captured and transformed into revenue for Aceh's Own Revenue (PAA). The failure to harness this leap in real potential has caused the management of the Aceh Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBA) to become trapped in a vortex of acute dependence on transfer funds from the central government. Concrete evidence from Aceh's 2024 revenue realization shows that transfer revenue dominates the budget, amounting to Rp8.16 trillion. This colossal figure easily overshadows the contribution ratio of Local Original Revenue (PAD), which amounted to only Rp3.28 trillion during the same evaluation period.

This fiscal imbalance is fundamentally rooted in a bureaucratic "comfort zone" created by the flood of Special Autonomy (Otsus) funds since 2008. The massive allocation of trillions of rupiah distributed across 23 regencies and cities has gradually fostered a dependency syndrome that has dulled the regions' instinct for innovation and self-reliance. Now, warnings of the end of this fiscal golden age are ringing ever louder as we approach a critical phase often referred to as the "Otsus Apocalypse." The Special Autonomy Fund allocation is projected to plummet sharply from Rp4.3 trillion in 2025 to Rp4.0 trillion in 2026, and is expected to nosedive to just 1 percent

of the National General Allocation Fund (DAU) by 2027. This projected decline has immediately sent shockwaves through the 2025 Aceh Provincial Budget (APBA), which has been forced to be drafted with a deficit of up to Rp209.8 billion. The vulnerability of Aceh's fiscal space due to this deficit becomes even more alarming when considered alongside the province's geographical reality, which features an extremely high Disaster Risk Index (IRB). Efforts to reduce the IRB through mitigation and early warning systems necessitate the availability of a substantial and liquid portion of the Contingency Fund (BT'T) in the regional treasury.

In the mitigation phase of addressing this fiscal emergency, the greatest fundamental challenge stems from the weakening performance of tax instruments and regional asset management. Aceh's 2025 tax revenue target is projected to contract by Rp207 billion as a direct result of the implementation of Aceh Qanun No. 4 of 2024, which reduced the Motor Vehicle Tax (PKB) rate to just 1 percent. While the tax sector is struggling, the scheme to optimize Aceh's State-Owned Assets (BMA) also remains far below expectations. The revenue target from the management of Aceh's Separated Assets which reflects dividend payments from regionally-owned enterprises (BUMD) is projected to remain stagnant at Rp265.7 billion in 2025. This fact indicates that the majority of government assets remain tied up as *idle* assets, which actually burden the maintenance budget without generating commensurate returns.

Discussions regarding the fragility of local fiscal capacity have, in fact, drawn sharp scrutiny in various academic publications. Previous research by Miswar, Lianda, and Priantana (2021) empirically demonstrated that tax and fee instruments exhibit a positive correlation with regional economic growth in Aceh. In the realm of asset management, Zaini (2021) also concluded that productive governance of Regional Government Assets is an absolute variable in boosting the financial autonomy of provincial governments. However, there is an analytical paradigm gap that radically separates these academic theoretical frameworks from the demands of urgent operational needs. The majority of previous studies have been overly macro-conceptual, focusing on improving administrative inventory systems, and have failed to prescribe a blend of aggressive, practical, and adaptive intensification strategies tailored to *the limited timeline* remaining until the 2027 Special Autonomy (Otsus) deadline. Addressing this gap, this article aims to fill a gap in the literature by formulating the central research question: what aggressive, breakthrough strategies must the Aceh Financial Management Agency (BPKA) implement to capitalize on the macroeconomic momentum of the real sector and convert it into PAA, in order to safeguard the fiscal position from the trap of chronic deficits, the threat of a collapsed social safety net, and vulnerabilities in post-2027 Special Autonomy disaster mitigation.

Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative approach using a descriptive-analytical *case study* design. The choice of the case study design is based on the highly specific nature of the Aceh Government's fiscal challenges, which are tied to a *specific* spatial and temporal

context namely, the threat of a drastic cut to the Special Autonomy Fund in 2027. The qualitative approach was chosen not merely to analyze the deficit phenomenon mathematically, but to explore in depth systemic behaviors, regulatory barriers, governance inefficiencies within tax collection mechanisms, and obstacles to the commercialization of regional assets.

Data collection in this study employed a triangulation technique that combined primary and secondary data to ensure the validity of the arguments. Primary data were obtained through the distribution of an *Open-Ended Questionnaire* to 50 *key informants* selected using *purposive sampling*. These key informants represent frontline revenue management officials, consisting of Heads of Regional Technical Implementation Units (UPTD/Samsat) throughout Aceh, officials responsible for the management of Aceh's State-Owned Assets (BMA) within the relevant Aceh Government Agencies (SKPA), and managerial staff of Regional State-Owned Enterprises (BUMD). This open-ended questionnaire method was optimized to identify technical issues, challenges in the digitization of tax collection, and the readiness of officials all simultaneously and based on factual observations from the field. Meanwhile, secondary data was comprehensively extracted through a review of institutional documents, including Aceh Qanun No. 1 of 2025 on the 2025 Aceh Provincial Budget (APBA), the General Budget Policies (KUA) for 2024 and 2025, the BPKA Performance Report, and macroeconomic data releases from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) of Aceh Province.

Data analysis was conducted using the *Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats* (SWOT) matrix method, quantified through the *Internal Factor Evaluation* (IFE) and *External Factor Evaluation* (EFE). The results of the weighting and ranking in the IFE and EFE matrices were then mapped onto a Strategic Position Quadrant Diagram to diagnose the institution's fiscal resilience status. In the final stage, alternative operational policies were formulated through a *Threats, Opportunities, Weaknesses, Strengths* (TOWS) matrix analysis, which cross-referenced determining factors to generate recommendations for both defensive and aggressive strategies aimed at turning the crisis around (*turnaround strategy*).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Theoretical Framework and Policy Gaps in Trade Administration

To academically dissect the complexity of the threat of fiscal paralysis following the 2027 Special Autonomy (Otsus) period, this discussion is constructed upon two main theoretical foundations: Fiscal Decentralization and the Concept of *Entrepreneurial Government*. In public economics literature, the success of fiscal decentralization in an autonomous region is measured by its ability to bridge *fiscal* needs through the optimization of its *fiscal capacity*. The paradox observed in Aceh Province where real sector economic growth of 4.09 percent does not correlate directly with an increase in Aceh's own-source revenue is a manifestation of

inefficiency in tax collection. The failure to convert *the taxable capacity* of this surplus real-sector export sector reflects fiscal leakage that undermines the very essence of regional autonomy.

Furthermore, an analysis through the lens of “Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy” a concept proposed by Osborne and Gaebler highlights the urgency of a paradigm shift in regional asset management. Adaptive governments are required to break free from the shackles of conventional paradigms that treat Regional-Owned Assets (BMD) merely as passive inventory assets that drain maintenance budgets (*cost centers*). These assets should instead be capitalized through business partnership instruments to generate net revenue (*profit centers*). The fact that projected dividend payments from regionally-owned enterprises (BUMD) are stagnating at Rp265.7 billion by 2025 serves as empirical evidence that the governance of the Regional Asset Management Agency (BPKA) remains rigid and has not yet transitioned toward an entrepreneurial bureaucratic mindset.

This theoretical gap is further exacerbated by anomalies in regional trade policies and regulations. At a time when fiscal space demands massive intensification due to the deadline for the termination of Special Autonomy (Otsus), the regional government instead issued Aceh Qanun No. 4 of 2024, which reduces the Motor Vehicle Tax rate to 1 percent. This populist policy which is not balanced by a strategy to expand the tax base to new sources or digitize tax collection is the primary cause of the loss of potential tax revenue amounting to Rp207 billion. This policy contradiction severely jeopardizes regional resilience, especially given the reality of Aceh’s Disaster Risk Index (IRB), which demands the availability of massive contingency funds (BTT) to mitigate public safety crises at any time.

Evaluation of Internal (IFE) and External (EFE) Factors

Based on the results of mapping conducted through open-ended questionnaires and document reviews, the value chain analysis of regional revenue governance was formulated into an evaluation of internal and external factors. On the internal dimension, the Aceh Government’s strengths rest on its massive portfolio of Aceh-owned assets spread across 23 regencies and cities, as well as the support of a hierarchically structured institutional infrastructure for revenue collection through UPTD/Samsat offices. However, these strengths are undermined by deeply entrenched systemic weaknesses. The lack of innovation in digitalization and the minimal adoption of *big data analytics* have led to high rates of *tax leakage*. This is exacerbated by *the low entrepreneurial mindset* among civil servants, which allows assets of economic value to languish as *idle* assets, as well as the inefficient performance of regionally-owned enterprises (BUMD), which fail to provide dividends proportional to the capital invested. The quantification results of the IFE Matrix show a total weighted score of 1.80, which is well below the average value

of 2.50, confirming that the internal pillar of the revenue management bureaucracy is in a highly fragile condition.

On the external front, the macroeconomic environment actually presents significant opportunities. Macroeconomic momentum in the first quarter of 2026 and the international trade surplus represent a substantial tax revenue potential. Furthermore, the deregulation of the Utilization Cooperation (KSP) or Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes with private investors, as well as the potential for cross-agency integration of law enforcement databases, offer avenues for tax base expansion. Nevertheless, these opportunities are overshadowed by destructive threats. The end of the Special Autonomy Fund (Otsus) regime, which has been shrinking exponentially, has created panic over an extreme deficit. This threat resonates with the high vulnerability to disaster risks, which necessitates the provision of BTT liquidity, as well as pressure from regulations on tax rate discounts. The results of the EFE Matrix calculation yielded a weighted score of 1.50, proving that local governments are currently failing to respond effectively to external turbulence and lack adequate mitigation buffers.

Strategic Position Quadrant Analysis

The strategic position of the Aceh Government in regional financial management is determined by the intersection of the total weighted values of internal factors (IFE Matrix) and external factors (EFE Matrix). Based on the quantitative calculations conducted in the previous subsection, the following coordinate scores were obtained:


X-Axis (Internal Factors / IFE) = 1.80 (Indicates internal conditions dominated by *Weaknesses*, as the value is below the median of 2.50).

Y-axis (External Factors / EFE) = 1.50 (Indicates a response to the external environment that is highly vulnerable to *Threats*, as it falls below the median value of 2.50).

The mathematical placement of the Aceh government's fiscal position in **Quadrant IV (the *Weakness-Threats* Quadrant)** carries very serious diagnostic implications and requires urgent attention from all regional policymakers. This position reflects the most vulnerable condition for a government organization, where the institution is besieged by a storm of destructive external threats, yet at the same time, its internal defenses are in a state of disrepair and not functioning optimally.

To present a transparent picture of this critical position to decision-makers, the coordinates (1.80; 1.50) are mapped into the SWOT strategic position quadrant diagram below:

Visualization of the Aceh Province SWOT Quadrant Matrix



The integration of the IFE Matrix score (1.80) on the X-axis and the EFE Matrix score (1.50) on the Y-axis mathematically places the Aceh government's strategic position in Quadrant IV, namely the *Weakness-Threats* (W-T) quadrant. Placement in this quadrant carries very serious diagnostic implications, reflecting a state of self-defense (*survival* mode) for the government institution. The W-T quadrant indicates that the BPKA is besieged by a storm of deadly external threats, such as the loss of trillions of rupiah from the central government and the risk of disasters, yet at the same time is armed with internal resources that are eroded by tax leakage and idle assets. Being in this quadrant confirms that evolutionary adaptation or mere cost-cutting no longer holds any relevance. The only way out to avoid fiscal bankruptcy is to implement a defensive-aggressive strategy oriented toward a radical *turnaround*.

Formulation of the TOWS Strategy

To respond to the crisis in Quadrant IV, a TOWS matrix analysis cross-references determining factors to identify operational policy alternatives. The S-O (*Strengths-Opportunities*) strategy is aimed at capitalizing on the UPTD network, combined with the integration of real-sector data to collect taxes from upstream economic activities, as well as converting the asset portfolio into a profit center through long-term private partnerships. Furthermore, the W-O (*Weaknesses-Opportunities*) Strategy focuses on implementing a centralized digital transformation of tax collection to break the chain of revenue leakage, as well as *outsourcing* the management of dormant assets to private professional consultants to address the lack of an entrepreneurial mindset among civil servants.

On the other hand, the S-T (*Strengths-Threats*) Strategy is designed to offset losses resulting from tax regulatory relaxation through aggressive mass collection operations of overdue payments by Samsat, as well as to reallocate the proceeds from special asset levies toward the establishment of a Disaster Reserve Fund. The culmination of this framework centers on the W-T (*Weaknesses-Threats*) Strategy as the core of the *turnaround* strategy. This strategy demands a total restructuring with the implementation of strict Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the management of state-owned enterprises (BUMDs) to compensate for the loss of Special Autonomy (Otsus) funds. Furthermore, this strategy mandates uncompromising *tax enforcement* such as blocking public services for major tax delinquents which is morally justified to safeguard fiscal liquidity needed to fund the social safety net and ensure the safety of the people of Aceh during this crisis. This series of TOWS analyses irrefutably proves that tax intensification and asset optimization are no longer routine work programs, but rather time-sensitive emergency rescue operations.

Evaluation and Selection of Policy Alternatives

Based on the results of the TOWS matrix analysis in the previous stage, there are three alternative operational policies that regional leaders can adopt to resolve the impasse regarding Aceh's Own Revenue (PAA). The first alternative is the Expansion of Real Sector Integration and Periodic Asset Partnerships, based on the *Strengths-Opportunities* (S-O) strategy. This alternative focuses on utilizing the government's organic infrastructure namely the UPTD/Samsat network and the portfolio of Aceh-Owned Assets (BMA) to gradually capitalize on opportunities arising from real sector economic growth. The second alternative is Radical Digital Transformation and Asset Management *Outsourcing*, derived from the *Weaknesses-Opportunities* (W-O) strategy. This option is designed to address bureaucratic inefficiencies by fully relying on high-tech interventions (*big data* systems and *auto-billing*) and delegating the management of *idle* assets to private property consultants. The third alternative is Aggressive Tax *Enforcement* and Disaster-Mitigation-Based Restructuring of Regional State-Owned Enterprises (BUMDs), derived from the *Weaknesses-Threats* (W-T) strategy. This option represents a turnaround intervention, in which the government directly executes repressive collection operations for overdue taxes and overhauls SOE management with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) focused on exponential dividend growth.

To determine the most viable and robust policy alternative to adopt, this study employs William Dunn's (2003) public policy evaluation method, which screens each option against six rigorous criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, equity, responsiveness, and feasibility. Based on the results of the weighting and assessment, Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 each received a total score of only 18, while Alternative 3 emerged as the clear winner with a total score of 28. The shortcoming of Alternative 1 lies in the criterion of *adequacy*. The normal organic pace of bureaucratic operations was deemed incapable of addressing the trillion-rupiah deficit resulting from the loss of the Special Autonomy Fund within the remaining timeframe of less than two years. On the other hand, Alternative 2 was

found to fail to meet the efficiency criterion. Developing a *big data* architecture and conducting *outsourcing* tenders would require a massive capital budget sacrifice. Given that the 2025 APBA is already projected to have a net deficit of Rp209.8 billion, forcing high-cost technology investments at this time is a fiscal impossibility.

The clear advantage of Alternative 3 is based on its fulfillment of very high standards of effectiveness and efficiency. A repressive law enforcement approach would immediately generate cash flow into the local government's coffers (*a "quick win"*) without having to wait for the bidding process for digital infrastructure procurement. This operation does not require significant capital investment; rather, it simply requires synergy between the executive branch and law enforcement agencies. More crucially, regarding the criteria of responsiveness and fairness, Alternative 3 is the only option that explicitly ensures the proceeds from the collection of these tax arrears are earmarked as liquidity for the Disaster-Related Unforeseen Expenditures (BTT) fund. Taking action to punish a handful of high-profile tax evaders and pressuring the stagnant management of state-owned enterprises (BUMD) to secure social safety net instruments for 5.63 million people in Aceh is viewed by the public as the most complete embodiment of distributive justice.

Considering the results of a comparative analysis using William Dunn's framework, aligned with urgency parameters leading up to 2027, the Aceh government's bureaucratic structure has proven to have no luxury of time to merely rely on organic reform. Therefore, an aggressive tax enforcement strategy and disaster-mitigation-based restructuring of BUMDs have been established as *the only viable* policy alternative. This policy is believed to be capable of creating a *"shock therapy"* effect that immediately plugs revenue leaks, safeguards regional cash liquidity from the collapse of poverty alleviation programs, and simultaneously ensures the availability of a financial buffer to mitigate residents' safety vulnerabilities from the threat of natural disasters.

Policy Recommendations and Implementation Roadmap

The concrete formulation of the selected alternative is realized through a recommendation to issue a Governor's Regulation (Pergub) or a Governor's Instruction of Aceh regarding the Emergency Strategy for Tax Law Enforcement and the Restructuring of Dividends from Regionally-Owned Enterprises (BUMD) Linked to the Disaster Safety Net. The selection of the Governor's Regulation as the instrument is based on the need for cross-sectoral intervention under the command of the Regional Head. Legally and institutionally, the Aceh Financial Management Agency (BPKA) serves as *the leading sector* because this agency acts in a dual capacity as both a financial manager and a collector of local taxes through a network of Regional Technical Implementation Units (UPTDs). This policy

imperatively regulates three main pillars. First, the implementation of *a conditional tax amnesty* with a very short duration, immediately followed by sanctions in the form of the suspension of public services (such as the freezing of regional banking services and the suspension of vehicle registration) for defiant tax delinquents. Second, the setting of a progressive dividend target for BUMDs of 300 percent over two years, accompanied by the threat of a board shake-up through an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders (EGMS). Third, a legally binding *earmarking* clause requiring that all revenue surges from these two measures be directly allocated to fund the Disaster Response Budget (BTT) and unemployment alleviation programs.

To ensure these policy recommendations are implemented in a measured manner before the nadir of the “Special Autonomy Apocalypse” occurs, a five-year implementation roadmap (2026–2030) has been drawn up.

In the first year (2026), the implementation phase will focus on regulatory legitimacy and *shock therapy*. The governor will formalize the legal framework for tax enforcement, followed by the implementation of a short-term tax amnesty as a final warning to tax evaders, as well as the convening of an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to set new dividend targets for regionally-owned enterprises (BUMD). The success indicator for this phase is the successful collection of 40 percent of the total historical tax arrears into the regional treasury.

Entering the second year (2027), which coincides with the most critical period of the Special Autonomy Fund (Dana Otsus) cut to the equivalent of 1 percent of the National General Allocation Fund (DAU), the implementation phase shifts toward repressive enforcement and the *earmarking* of funds. The Regional Audit Board (BPKA) coordinates with the Police and the Licensing Agency to carry out a massive suspension of services against entities that refuse to comply, as well as to execute an initial reshuffle of the board of directors for BUMDs that fail to meet the transition targets. During this period, the initial cash allocation for the Disaster Response Fund (BTT) must be funded entirely from the Regional Revenue Fund (PAA) without relying on central government transfers, with a target of reducing *tax leakage* by up to 70 percent.

Furthermore, in the third year (2028), the implementation phase will focus on deficit substitution and aggressive asset management. The government will begin rolling out large-scale *outsourcing* and Asset Utilization Partnership (KSP) schemes for all Aceh-owned assets that have been *idle*. Asset seizures will also be enforced against corporations that continue to default on their tax payments. The success indicator for this year is marked by a surge in PAA of at least 150 percent compared to the 2024 realization, thereby reducing the APBA deficit below a rational threshold.

In the fourth year (2029), the policy enters a phase of operational self-reliance and expansion of the real sector. The tax collection system begins to be forcibly integrated with *the export activity database* to capture taxpayers from the real sector

who were previously *unrecorded*. Dividend payments from regionally-owned enterprises (BUMD) are targeted to have peaked to finance strategic regional programs, with the indicator being that no government assets are classified as *cost centers*.

Finally, in the fifth year (2030), the implementation phase achieves a level of fiscal stability and sustainable disaster resilience. The fiscal resilience system has become institutionalized, allowing the PAA instruments to operate organically with a high level of compliance without the need for further mass repressive operations. At this point, the financing of social safety nets and disaster mitigation infrastructure for millions of Aceh residents is targeted to be funded 100 percent from the region's independent cash reserves.

Conclusion

Based on the entire series of theoretical dialectics and empirical analysis, this article concludes that the Aceh Government is currently teetering on the brink of a structural fiscal crisis. The threat of the Special Autonomy Fund coming to an end which will be sharply reduced by 2027 is a mathematical reality that has already begun to push the APBA into a deficit. This crisis creates a stark irony when viewed against the backdrop of the region's macroeconomic reality. At a time when fiscal space is contracting, the real sector's economic activity in Aceh is actually showing positive growth, accompanied by a high-value export surplus. This fact proves that the fiscal vulnerability currently experienced by the regional treasury is not solely the result of a lack of money circulating in the community, but stems strongly from systemic inefficiencies within the government bureaucracy. The failure to address the massive tax collection leakage caused by a lack of innovation, combined with the stagnation in the commercialization of hundreds of Aceh-owned assets and low dividend payments from regionally-owned enterprises (BUMD), has created a deadly fiscal trap.

A quantitative diagnosis using an evaluation matrix of internal and external factors unequivocally places Aceh's revenue management architecture in Quadrant IV (*Weaknesses-Threats*). This position serves as a stark warning that conventional bureaucratic practices have become completely obsolete. The failure to collect taxes and optimize assets not only hinders government operations but also leads to a large-scale humanitarian threat: the paralysis of poverty alleviation instruments and the depletion of the Contingency Fund, which is essential for mitigating the risks of natural disasters that constantly threaten the lives of millions of Acehnese people.

Through a rigorous application of William Dunn's policy evaluation methodology, this study demonstrates that slow, organic reform strategies or capital-intensive technological investments are no longer sufficient to safeguard regional autonomy within the remaining timeframe. *The implementation of a defensive-aggressive turnaround-oriented strategy through repressive tax*

enforcement and a total restructuring of asset management has proven to be the only resolution that is most effective, efficient, and equitable. These policy recommendations are, in essence, a moral call and a test of leadership for decision-makers in Aceh. Executing this emergency strategy absolutely requires strong *political will* to crack down on those evading tax obligations and on stagnant asset management. Such firmness is the price that must be paid in full today to preserve the dignity of Aceh's fiscal autonomy, ensure the sustainability of basic services, and protect the entire community from the threat of regional bankruptcy in the post-Special Autonomy era.

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